CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES*
University of Zimbabwe
P O Box MP 167
Mount Pleasant
HARARE

(CASS Occasional Paper - NRM Series ; 1996)

ECOTOURISM
A Comparative Analysis of Findings from Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa* *

By
Dr Richard Hasler* * *

April 1996

* A Member of IUCN - The World Conservation Union

** Paper presented at a CASS/WWF Seminar, 13 September, 1995.

*** Principle Scientific Officer, Environmental Evaluation Unit,
University of Cape Town; and (formerly)
Research Fellow, Centre for Applied Social Sciences,
University of Zimbabwe.

TABLE OF CONTENTS


ELEPHANTS HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY!

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

Tourism is a US$3.4 trillion a year global industry and, according to the World Tourism Organisation, the industry is expanding at 4 percent every year, the fastest growing industry in the world. In 1994, Africa as a whole accounted for only US$6.3 billion worth of tourist receipts, most of which was spent in North Africa. Southern Africa is currently attempting to gain a greater share of these tourist receipts and is trying to foster inter-regional tourism through such newly formed organisations as the Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa (RETOSA). A key aim of this organisation is to encourage inter-regional marketing packages to increase the volume of tourist receipts in the region. Such marketing networks are the first step towards creating packaged mass tourism.

"Nature Tourism"[1] in Africa often involves the pursuit of "Wild Africa". The myth of "Wild Africa" is perpetuated as a marketing strategy to sell tourism to regional and international tourists. Yet in Kenya, in the last ten to twenty years, ever increasing tourism has found itself in competition with environmental conservation, agriculture, and other land and marine use strategies. Tourism is not simply the creation of a drama, it also gives tourists rights in the country they visit since they pay for a product. Such rights impact on the host countries social system. Tourists have a right to food, accommodation, medical treatment, transport system and access to parks and natural resources which are part of their tourist product. In areas which are relatively unexposed to tourism, tourists are often involved in a process of propagation of value systems which clash or impact strongly on the cultures with which they come into contact. The frivolous *Prayer for Tourist* post card (see page 2), sold in a staunchly Islamic part of the Kenya Coast, sums up this clash of values between the sacred and the profane. In this context, the clash is most vividly symbolised through norms concerning appropriate dress: the skimpily dressed beach tourist and the local Islamic women dressed in full black veil or *chador* are often seen in the same context.

[1] Throughout this paper terms such as: ecotourism, nature tourism, adventure tourism, sustainable tourism, and alternative tourism are used. There is considerable ambiguity and overlap in the way these terms are used by the tourist industry and I have not attempted to differentiate them. The terms are often used to evoke a sense of ecologically sound tourism. The point is that significant contradictions between rhetoric and tourism practice exist in the use of these terms.

In Africa, tourists have a perceived right to experience the myth of wild Africa and to perpetuate it. For instance, tourists feel that they have a right to see endangered species such as rhino, elephant, leopard and cheetah. Their rights are often supported by international lobby groups and are often more important than the rights of local people who may not afford to see these animals. Contiguous local people may not want to see wild animals because it will usually mean that their crops, property or lives are endangered.

PRAYER FOR TOURIST

Dear God, look down on us your humble tourists, who are doomed to travel this earth, taking photographs, sending postcards, shopping for souvenirs and walking around in drip-dry underwear.

Give us this day divine guidance in the selection of our hotels and lodges, that we may find our reservations honored, our rooms made up and hot water running from the taps.

We pray that the telephones work, and the operators answer and speak our language.

Lead us, dear Lord, to good, inexpensive restaurants where the food is superb, the waiters friendly and the wine included in the price.

Give us the wisdom to tip correctly in currencies we do not understand. Forgive us for undertipping out of ignorance and overtipping out of fear. Make the people love us for what we are, and not for what we can contribute to their worldly goods.

Grant us the endurance to visit the lodges and game reserves listed as "musts" in the guidebooks.

And if perchance we skip an important game ride to take a nap after lunch, have mercy on us, for our flesh is weak.

Tourism is, therefore, a complex socio-cultural phenomenon. It involves the learned behaviours, attitudes and values associated with a leisure traveller's experiences within a historically defined political and economic context. Western concepts of tourism are influenced by unequal historical, economic and political factors which influence values, behaviours and institutional arrangements associated with international travel, especially between rich areas and poor areas.

ECOTOURISM DEFINED BY WHAT IT DOES

Ecotourism can be defined as a marketing strategy or a segmentation within the complex socioeconomic forces that constitute tourism. Ecotourism is defined by the Ecotourism Society in terms of what they assert the market segment does: "ecotourism conserves the natural environment and well-being of local people through responsible travel" (Western 1994, 16).

Ecotourism, therefore, has two substantive elements which differentiate it from standard tourism. It claims to:

* conserve the natural environment; and
* benefits the local people.

Ecotourism usually claims to achieve these two ideals by providing economic incentives. This paper analyses the practical results of attempts at ecotourism in three African countries over the last ten to fifty years.

ECOTOURISM IS TOURISM

Ecotourism is tourism. A central problem with tourism is that its historical evolution in the 20th Century involves the phase of mass tourism (see Figure 1). Mass tourism occurs wherever the negative impacts of tourism are a result of the large numbers of tourist arrivals. Mass tourism is usually characterised by the environmental and social costs of tourism being greater than the alleged benefits. Mass tourism, therefore, involves a net environmental and social loss

from tourism[2]. The danger of mass tourism is that it may destroy the environmental and social foundation for ecotourism, as well as compromising other sustainable uses of agriculture, fishing, hunting, and natural resource management. This is the evolutionary *Catch Twenty Two* of successful ecotourism (see Figure 1). Success breeds failure and ecotourism becomes mass tourism.

Ecotourism springs from an ahistorical, synchronic and functional analysis of tourism, couched in terms of its present social and environmental impacts rather than its historical development as part of the political economy. Thus ecotourism attempts both teleologically and tautologically to treat the negative symptoms of tourism, and portrays itself as being both environmentally sustainable and culturally and socially appropriate. The evolution of this marketing segment diachronically (i.e., what ecotourism evolves into over time) is seldom discussed except in non-historical micro-level sustainability terms. That is, people are asking, "Will all the litter be picked up in the camp-site when the picnic is over?" When they should be asking, "What are the implications of the camp-site being turned into a casino-hotel conglomerate?".

Ecotourism, soft-tourism, community-based tourism, nature tourism, conservation tourism, culture tourism, alternative travel ... whatever the marketing segment or label might be, whatever rhetorical gloss is used, essentially ecotourism is TOURISM. This paper argues that ecotourism in Africa is often the exploratory phase of mass tourism. This is an essential first point in the analysis.

The second essential point is that the historical development of ecotourism in Africa has been observed and analysed for at least the last thirty years. Therefore, baseline data and analyses are available. There is, arguably, nothing new about ecotourism except that people say that the time is now ripe for it to be instituted. Few people realise that it has already been tried and tested in Africa and elsewhere.

---

[2] It is often very difficult to place an economic value on environmental and social costs. Usually these are underestimated.

THE COSTA RICAN EXPERIENCE

David Western has argued that the term ecotourism emerged out of concern to save the South American rain forests. The argument was that, if enough nature loving tourists turned up to appreciate the forests, this would conserve them from logging, ranching, and settlement (Western 1994, 15). Mass tourism can, in this sense, provide an economic incentive for governments, the tourism industry and local communities to conserve their natural resources instead of depleting them for short term gains. That is, mass tourism can be ecotourism if it protects the environment and benefits local people. This argument is an example of the synchronic and functional view of tourism. The historical development of tourism in Costa Rica belies this. Ironically, the turn-out of these benign nature and people loving tourists in Costa Rica has been so great that it is now "... hastening the destruction of the very thing people came to worship" (Baker 1994, 52-53). Because Costa Rica lacks a tourism development plan to control growth, developers are pushing up hotels in sensitive areas such as the coastal strip and wet lands. Yet Costa Rica was the primary ecotourist destination in the Americas, and more research and thought has been put into ecotourism in Costa Rica than in any other country in the world (Ashton 1992).

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS OF ECOTOURISM IN KENYA

Of the three countries considered, Kenya has the longest history of negotiation between local government, local communities, central government, and investment funding from private or governmental sources in regard to ecotourism. Kenya's experiments with ecotourism predate those experiments currently taking place in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Recent trends in Kenya's tourism industry teach us important lessons for the Southern African tourism industry.

In the late 1980's and early 1990's, wildlife and coastal tourism became Kenya's number one currency earner. In 1980, tourism earned US$418 million, and in 1992, US $415 million dollars; and yet, in 1993, tourism earned only US $313 million, losing its status as number one currency earner to tea (Shaw 1994, 4). International visitor numbers increased from 35,000 in 1955 (Western 1994, 17) to 826,000 in 1993 (Shaw 1994, 4). Between 1980 and 1989, the number of international tourist arrivals doubled from 362,000 to 713,800 (World Tourism

Organisation Statistics 1987/88). In Kenyan Shilling terms, earnings increased by a multiple of five over that decade (82.5 million in 1980 to 432 million in 1989). In US dollar terms Kenya allegedly earned more in 1980 than it did in either 1991, 1992 or 1993 (Shaw 1994, 4). Thus despite the phenomenal increase in tourist arrivals the hard currency earnings from tourism as a whole have fallen (Shaw 1994, 4), and the foreign currency earnings per tourist have dwindled to less than half over the decade. Despite this trend in the decrease in hard currency earnings per tourist, more tourists are projected and 950,000 were hoped for in 1994. The stark reality is that more and more tourists are bringing less and less money. This is possible through leakage of revenue (see discussion below) such as occurs with package tours organised from country of origin using foreign owned carriers, hotel and car rental companies.

The environmental and social costs of mass tourism in Kenya include:

* squatter/informal settlements;
* increased crime and prostitution directly related to tourism;
* inadequate sewerage disposal;
* increased inflation in the price of local commodities;
* over utilization of parks;
* decrease in the quality of the tourism experience; and
* many other factors.

Yet, Kenyans want the industry to continue expanding and believe that they can counter the negative impacts by opening up more and more areas to ecotourism, thereby shedding the load off the current popular destinations. It is indeed ironic that a large proportion of this mass tourism is now occurring in sites which were originally planned as environmentally friendly, community based ecotourism sites. Ironically, the research into ecotourism in these sites in the 1970's has inspired and informed many of the community based management experiments occurring in other African countries.

In Kenya, the Maasai Mara and Amboseli Council Game Reserves were specifically established to involve local communities in conservation. Conceived and established 30 years ago and initially negotiated 45 years ago, they provide important lessons in ecotourism[3]. In the 1950's, documented negotiation regarding the reduction of livestock numbers in the Amboseli basin took place between the Kenya National Parks and local Maasai elders who were living in the Amboseli National Reserve and it was agreed that a proportion of the entry fees were to be paid to the Maasai. At that time the only way funds could be channelled was through the district council at Kajiado and "none of this money found its way into the hands of the people around the Reserve for whom it was intended" (Kenya Wildlife Service 1990, Annex 6, 165). In 1968, a development plan for a multiple use conservation area was established for Amboseli which was adopted within the traditional political and cultural framework associated with the Maasai, in conjunction with the existing administrative structures of the Kenyan state (Western and Thresher, 1973).

David Western, a researcher, and Sindiyo, the warden of the County Council Reserve at the time, set up a wildlife committee which continued to exist for the next twenty years to be used or ignored by subsequent wardens. This plan worked towards the integration of livestock and wildlife economies to reduce conflict between these land use strategies. Revenues were to accrue from tourist development, such as the establishment of tourist lodges, which would involve the payment of wildlife utilization fees to Maasai group ranch holders next to Amboseli. These ranches were to accommodate migratory wildlife herds, be involved in leasing out hunting and tourist concessions, develop water resources for their cattle herds, and establish a communal centre. The Maasai who traditionally coexisted with cattle and livestock had historically resisted the establishment of the reserves as they felt it was an attempt to appropriate their land.

---

[3] As early as the 1950s, the director of the national parks and the Amboseli warden proposed that the Amboseli Maasai should get a portion of the revenue generated by the reserve. Since 1961, Amboseli game reserve has generated income for the Kajiado District Council. When Amboseli became a national park, the council retained a small piece of land, a safari lodge and continued to earn a percentage of gate fees.

In 1974, the local Maasai in the Amboseli area became joint owners of the surrounding rangelands as a number of group ranches were established. Simultaneously, Amboseli was gazetted a National Park and negotiations continued with the Maasai about suitable compensations and benefits from the National Park. Group Ranch committees were formed to manage the affairs of the group ranches. Wildlife and tourism issues fell under their jurisdiction. However, these committees had little cohesion. In 1977, further discussion led to the 1977 park agreement, through which adequate water was to be provided for Maasai livestock outside the park, and there was to be compensation for the toleration of wildlife grazing on group ranch lands. It was planned that the costs were to be eventually phased out when they were off-set by the predicted revenue group ranches would earn from tourism activities. Infrastructural services such as a school and a dispensary were to be provided. These plans were subjected to extensive negotiation between the county council, group ranch representatives, and the central government under the auspices of the World Bank which was providing funds for a project to improve the infrastructure of Amboseli, provided local people received a share of revenue generated (Kenya Wildlife Services 1990, Annex 6).

In the late 1970's, the plan met with a number of obstacles which included the Kenyan government's ban on hunting, depriving ranches of significant revenue[4], and the flagging tourist market. A significant and recurring problem (one that is not confined to Kenya) was that resource benefits were being co-opted and mismanaged at national and district levels by the councils, departments and ministries involved in wildlife management (Hamilton 1992). Inequity of revenue sharing and the co-opting of local resources by local, district, national and international elites is, therefore, the crucial problem in ecotourism management.

[4] "Prior to the ban on hunting in 1977, a lucrative source of income from wildlife was hunting. Between 1958 and 1974 the Kajiado District outside of the Parks was divided into controlled area hunting and photographic blocks. License fees went to the central government, and controlled area fees charges for each animal shot went to the county council. With the establishment of the former hunting blocks into private and group ranches the district was redivided into "wildlife management units". The wildlife management department helped negotiate hunting concessions on group ranches. Hunting and tourist companies leased blocks directly from the Maasai earning considerable revenue. However, there were often delays and improper distribution of fees to group ranches. The government ban on sport hunting in 1977 stopped this source of income.

LEAKAGE

Other writers have referred to this same problem in the tourist industry, as a whole, as "leakage". Leakage, in this sense, refers to the amount of tourist revenue that does not stay in the host country, or destination, and results from paying for imported skills, technologies and commodities to support tourism. For example, repatriation of profits from international hotels, car rental companies, oil imports, marketing abroad, etc. I also use it to refer to the amount raked off by the various levels, institutions and individuals, involved in ecotourist negotiations and which, therefore, does not reach the local level. A good example, in the Kenyan context, is the leakage that takes place when revenues designed for local people go through county councils.

The Kenyan examples employ the assumptions about participation and devolution of benefits to local communities through both culturally based and state institutions. The Kenyan ecotourism outcomes underline the need to clarify local communities legal rights of access to these benefits in such a multi-jurisdictional tourism process. For example, in 1989 David Western estimated that the Amboseli National Park generated about Ksh300 million (Kenyan shillings) mainly from accommodation, tariffs, game drives, camping, road and air transport, and park entrance fees (Kenya Wildlife Service 1990, Annex 6, 133). Of this figure less than 3 percent stayed in Kajiado District. Of the 6 million shillings remaining in Kajiado district 50 percent remained with the Kajiado county council in the form of royalties from the park, leaving very little left for "local benefit".

Olgulului Group Ranch surrounds the Amboseli Park and traditionally it was the people of Olgulului who agreed to hand over 150 square kilometres to the new park and move out of the area. They therefore feel that they should receive the highest compensation. But the park agreement under which grazing compensation was to be given, was discontinued in 1983 and the agreement to provide water for their herds outside the park was not met. Local level plans and agreements are therefore subject to much wider economic and political forces. Institutional and governmental differentiation of functions means that different ministries and departments have jurisdiction over different aspects of local life. Furthermore, competing jurisdictions exist at district, provincial, national and international levels. Tourism is particularly subject to these different functions because it is a

reflection of political and economic processes at international, national and district levels. The political economy of tourism in Kenya is not based and can not be based at the local level, because travellers come from elsewhere, and one of their biggest expenses is their international flight. Ecotourism ignores this reality at the expense of becoming a purely facile notion. The systematic marginalization of the local level, in favour of other vested interests at higher levels, such as the economic issues that determine the networks of aircraft travel, is a reality that can not be avoided.

MAASAI MARA

The Maasai Mara reserve was placed under the direct control of the Narok County Council in 1961, the rationale being that the long term sustainability of local resources is tied up with the benefits to local people. The reserve is a small corner of the vast Serengeti ecosystem of Tanzania which stretches into Kenya. It is part of one of the most productive natural terrestrial ecosystems. The Maasai Mara is one of the most visited reserves in East Africa and the group ranches which lie next to it are a vital part of the dispersal area for such tourist attractions as the annual migrations of approximately 2 million wildebeest, zebra and Thomsons' gazelle between their wet season range in the north and the dry season range in the south. A third of all safari's within Kenya visit the Maasai Mara (Western 1991). Between 1980 and 1990 the annual numbers of visitors to the reserve almost doubled from 84,094 in 1980 to 161,434 in 1990. Over that period the number of bed nights more than doubled from 113,549 in 1980 to 254,574 in 1990 (Koikai 1991,). Keekorok Lodge was the first lodge to be built (1965) and between 1972 and 1991, 16 more lodges were built with a capacity of 1,492 visitors at any one time. 890 of these potential bed nights are located outside the reserve on the Maasai group ranches.

In evaluating the impact of this rapid increase in use of the park and surrounding areas the most obvious question to ask is who benefits and who pays the environmental and social costs? The general trend is that the main beneficiaries were the private tourist industry, to a lesser extent the Narok District Council, and to a much lesser extent the group ranches. The profits that accrue from tourism are largely in the hands of outside operators. For example, Norton-Griffiths indicates that in 1989 US 20 million in revenue was generated by the Maasai Mara

National Reserve and US$10 million on the group ranches. He states that for the main part these revenues are created by and channelled through operators of package tours, tented safaris, balloon safaris, lodges and airlines. He states that the revenues that do go directly to landowners are through employment, bed night and visitor fees and lease fees. In 1989, the landowners received only 1.6 percent of the tourist revenues generated on their land (Norton-Griffiths 1994).

Douglas-Hamilton and Associates estimated that in 1987 tourism operations on the National Reserve and the surrounding group ranches generated an estimated Ksh444 million of which 26 million were retained in Maasai Mara area and Narok district. Of this figure Narok county council earned Ksh23 million and the group ranches earned Ksh2.8 million. In other words, less than one percent went to local group ranches (Hamilton 1988).

Since 1989 the Narok County Council has been collecting Ksh50 (currently about US $1) from every visitor to the reserve and distributing the amount to the adjacent group ranches in an attempt to get direct benefits back from tourism. Organisations such as the Ol Choro Oirua Wildlife Management and Conservation Association and other similar associations in other parts of Kenya exist through which the problems identified above are being addressed. This small group of eight landowners lying next to the Maasai Mara National Park are attempting to plough back the revenues that are earned through tourism into direct benefits for local people. Lodges on these group ranches pay a ten year concession lease and a percentage of the bed night fee plus a game viewing fee to the association.

- Thirty percent of this revenue is divided among the private group ranch holders.
- Nineteen percent of this revenue is divided among the group ranch neighbours in an attempt to provide them with an economic incentive to continue having wildlife on their land.
- Ten percent is for long term community projects in the area including schools, hospitals and bursaries.
- Six percent is for the rhino programme that exists on the ranches.

- Five percent is for vehicle contingency fund and thirty percent is for administration of the association (personal communication with Orr, December 1994).

Mechanisms such as these have met with growing political opposition form Narok County Council, who historically earned revenue from both the Maasai Mara and the surrounding ranches during the era when these were all held under communal tenure.

Attempts to secure the area for wildlife conservation have also come under attack from politicians lobbying for lucrative wheat growing in the area. A key problem in the long term evaluation of such conservation initiatives is the environmental and social costs of an ecotourism which has to keep expanding in order to pay the numerous allocations of revenue. The tourism experience, the physical environment, and the impact of the social costs of tourism all bear the brunt in the process.

The same problem faces the Kenya Wildlife Service Community Conservation Programme whose central theme on private land is the shifting of rights, responsibilities and revenue to the land owners who conserve wildlife. The key element of this is revenue sharing in exchange for contractual obligations of the land holders vis-a-vis wildlife management. It therefore is not conceived in terms of a hand-out, but as meeting the opportunity costs of having wildlife on private land. The Kenya Wildlife 1991-95 plan claims that twenty-five percent of all gate fees earned will be distributed through appropriate local channels such as group ranch committees. County councils were rejected as a conduit for this revenue sharing because even perfectly representative county councils represent the interests of a much wider constituency than simply the park dispersal areas.[5] Ironically, therefore, the debate and negotiation is substantively exactly the same in the 1990s as the debate that took place between Maasai elders and park wardens in the 1950's. This brings us to the key technical questions raised by the Kenyan material: How do you get benefits back to local people when you are dealing with multiple

[5] This is an incisive conclusion from fifty years of discussion, negotiation and experiment in the Kenyan context. It is pertinent in that the same problem of devolving benefits plagues many areas where the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is practised in Zimbabwe.

levels of revenue extraction and leakage?[6] Because of the large number of components in the tourism industry (natural and cultural resources and events, infrastructure, tourism plant, wholesalers, retailers and consumers; (see Figure 2) ecotourism is particularly prone to leakage.

A significant current thrust is that of "empowering communities" and the Kenya Wildlife Service have drawn on the expertise of NGO's involved in the Freirian methods associated with making people aware of their options and proposing their own solutions (Berger 1993). The problem with this approach to ecotourism is that people can talk about their problems, such as leakage (see page 8), and propose solutions but if systematic marginalization of local initiatives is enforced by legal and institutional frameworks it is extremely difficult for local people to implement their own solutions without a great deal of co-operation from higher levels. In linguistic terms this dilemma is like the difference between an etic or emic explanation. People immersed in a certain culture, belief system or way of doing things will be able to explain their thinking and actions in terms of the framework they belong to. There is another order of explanation which may provide important insights into the culture or way of doing things. This is the framework of the outside observer who analyses these internal meanings comparatively. Some of the main problems in implementing ecotourism are structural ones that relate to the political culture and economic hierarchies that are involved in tourism and the long term historical cycles associated with tourism. The components of the tourism process (see Figure 2) are such that local people by themselves are not equipped to plan tourist endeavour. In order for community involvement in ecotourism to take place successful negotiation has to take place between the private tourist industry, the government authorities involved in tourism and the local community. Each of these is internally differentiated and responds to dynamics. For example, operators in the private tourist industry compete with each other to capture a piece of an ever changing, dynamic tourist market. Local communities are not homogeneous and frequently are highly divided in regard to decisions about local resource use. Wildlife departments or agencies, local government and government authorities with jurisdiction over mineral and natural resources may have very different agendas which impinge on local plans to conduct ecotourism (e.g., what

6 The context within which the debate has taken place has changed dramatically, but the debate itself has stayed the same. Ecotourism simply puts a gloss on a debate that has been bouncing back and forth for the last fifty years in the Kenyan context.

happens to local ecotourism plans when government decides to drill for oil, build a dam, mine for gold or designate the area for wheat farming?).

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND CRAFTY EXPLOITATION

One of the most frequently cited benefits of tourism is employment. In the Maasai Mara context Killian was able to obtain data on the extent to which Maasai were involved in the tourism industry and identified the kind of jobs available or occupied by local Maasai in the 15 lodges existing at the time of his study (Killian 199[1]). Despite clauses in lodge employment procedures to the effect that local Maasai should get preferential employment, he identified that out of a total of 1,065 workers, 370 claimed to be Maasai. He states that a number of workers purported to be Maasai when in fact they were not. Furthermore, he identified that most of these 370 Maasai undertook the menial jobs (paid the lowest salaries) as opposed to the managerial and skilled jobs. His data also indicates that most of the jobs provided were not allocated to people who lived near to the lodges.

Tourism seems to be a famine or a feast when it comes to employment opportunities and profit margins. A large craft business exists on the road to and from Narok to the Maasai Mara, where one can be charged twenty times the going rate for craft items. For example, a *kikoi* (cloth warn by men) which sells for Ksh180 (US$4.50) in Mombasa, was here offered at a starting price of Ksh4000 (US$100). Killian (personal communication, December 1994) reports that these businesses are frequently not owned by local Maasai, but by business men from Nairobi. A trip to the Maasai Mara inevitably entails a paid visit to a Maasai traditional village. Again the danger is that this kind of interaction becomes mutually exploitative. Maasai culture is commoditized for tourism, and genuine tourist interest in culture can easily be exploited and manipulated for economic gains. A drama or charade has to be presented for the tourist, and inevitably there is a degree of artificiality and artifact in the interaction (see Smith 1989).

ECOTOURISM COMPETES WITH OTHER LAND USE STRATEGIES

Against this backdrop of the lack of local benefit, or inappropriate transactions resulting from tourism, it must be understood that the

single greatest threat to the Maasai Mara ecosystem is the rapid expansion of crop agriculture mainly wheat farming on the Loita Plains (Goodman 1993). The expansion of wheat farming is interesting for those observers from Southern Africa who have argued that a privatisation of communal land tends to provide incentive for landowners to conserve their natural resources. In the case of the Maasai Mara, privatisation has lead to subdivision and sale of traditional Maasai land for wheat farming. Privatisation, has in this sense, contributed to the insecurity of the historical human/wildlife interactions on these plains and it may also ultimately lead to the loss of Maasai land. Norton- Griffiths argues that the reason is that there are large discrepancies between the revenues Maasai landowners earn from livestock management, tourism and agriculture in comparison to using the same land to its full agricultural potential. The revenue differential is as much as 1:22 on land with good agricultural potential. He proposes a system by which the landowners are paid the opportunity costs to set aside their land for wildlife and claims that these funds could be derived from tourism and other sources[7]. However, he points out that the present community based wildlife conservation and utilization programs in the Serengeti ecosystem will not generate the scale of revenues needed to prevent agricultural development, and therefore indicates that the group ranches will abandon conservation by default under the prevailing revenues derived from wildlife tourism (Norton-Griffiths 1993).

IS ECOTOURISM UNDERMINING THE MAASAI MARA?

Goodman points out the irony that while the Maasai Mara is in grave danger of being overrun by wheat farming, the indiscriminate and uncontrolled ecotourism taking place in the heart of the ecosystem is placing it in jeopardy. Of particular note is the *ad hoc* development of lodges and camps, with little respect for environmental impact. The most evident of these impacts is from the tour vehicles which drive across the planes in any direction, and are not restricted to tracks. The radio contact that exists between drivers attempting to show their clients the best snap shots of the "big five" (i.e., elephant, rhino, lion, buffalo, and leopard), and thereby get a good tip at the end of the safari, is focal for understanding this negative impact. It is not unusual for a single lion or cheetah in the Mara to be surrounded by

[7] This is somewhat like the "We'll buy the Amazon" solution to conservation problems allegedly proposed by American environmental economists.

thirty vehicles each with an average of six tourists appreciating nature (see photograph on front cover of this paper). From the air the Mara is essentially a spider web of vehicle tracks which are steadily eroding the landscape. Is this ecotourism? The answer is that this is what ecotourism plans can end up as being. As market trends force Kenya to open up new areas to new uses, it is wise to evaluate ecotourism in terms of the lessons provided by the historical development of ecotourism in Kenya to date. These lessons are as follows:

* There is a tendency for successful ecotourism to become mass tourism (see Figure 1). This can only be controlled by the establishment of regulations concerning *ad hoc* tourist development.

  Leakage of tourism revenue must not be underestimated. Elaborate mechanisms concerning contractual agreements specifying benefits of tourism at the local level need to be established. For more on this see technical section on Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme.

* The pervading political culture and management systems largely determine whether local level institutions (councils, group ranches, committees, etc.) can be effective. The technical aspects of ecotourism alone cannot ensure success.

It is also obvious that these lessons have direct bearing on plans for ecotourism experiments in Zimbabwe and South Africa which will also succumb to market pressure to open up new areas.

THE TOURISM SELF-DESTRUCT SYNDROME

1) A remote and exotic spot offers peaceful rest and relaxation and provides an escape for the rich or adventurous, who live in isolation from the resident population.

2) Tourism promotion attracts persons of middle income, who come as much for the rest and relaxation as to imitate the rich or adventurous. More and more hotel accommodation and tourist

facilities are built to attract and accommodate more and more tourists.

3) This transforms the original character of the place from an "escape paradise" to a series of conurbations, with several consequences:

* Some local residents become tourism employees and earn more than ever before, while others lose access to resources which formerly sustained them, but now are co-opted by the tourist market.

* The rich tourists move on elsewhere, because the quality of their experience has been compromised by the tourist development.

* The growth in the tourist population makes interaction between tourist and resident population inevitable leading to a variety of social consequences.

* Increased tourist accommodation capacity leads to an excess of supply over demand, and a deterioration in product and price. The country resorts to mass tourism, attracting people of lower standards of social behaviour and economic power. This leads to the social and environmental degradation of the tourist destination.

* As the place sinks under the weight of social friction and solid waste, tourists exit, leaving behind derelict tourism facilities, littered beaches and country side, and a resident population that cannot return to its former way of life: (modified by the author from Sobers, undated)

As we have seen, Kenya is at a cross-roads in the historical development of tourism; and as the mass tourist experience is eroded by the impacts of steadily increasing urban and rural poverty and squalor, crime, political instability, solid waste and environmental

degradation, several Kenyan scholars and observers have expressed the idea that tourists will soon abandon Kenya in favour of other destinations where these negative impacts are not as critical. Predictions of massive increases in tourist arrivals have been predicted for both Zimbabwe and South Africa (EXA International/CHL Consulting Group 1993). The key questions are how to plan a strategy to cope with masses of tourists, particularly in regard to the opening up of areas hitherto unutilised by tourists, and where does ecotourism fit into this picture?

CONSUMPTIVE OR NON-CONSUMPTIVE ECOTOURISM IN ZIMBABWE

Tourism is Zimbabwe's fastest growing industry and is the country's third largest foreign currency earner. In 1994, visitor arrivals for the first time passed the million mark (1,039 031). According to the Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation, the annual increase was a 15 percent upsurge from the 1993 figure. It is estimated that by the year two thousand 1.5 million visitors a year will arrive in Zimbabwe. Jones indicates that tourist arrivals in Zimbabwe have increased at an average rate of 8.4 percent per annum since the end of the civil war in 1980 (Jones and Hasler 1994). The Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation tourist statistics indicate an increase in tourist arrivals from 268,418 in 1980 to 703,279 in 1992. According to Jones, the average number of nights spent in Zimbabwe per tourist has declined from 10.9 nights in 1980 to 5.3 nights in 1993 (Jones and Hasler 1994, 26). Jones also stated that the regional markets provide over 86 percent of the total number of visitors to Zimbabwe; 49.6 percent of total arrivals are from South Africa. The percentage of arrivals from North America, Europe and other international arrivals is therefore a relatively small percentage of the total number but this sector is likely to grow at a steady rate of up to 9 percent per annum until such time as these international tourists choose an alternative destination (Financial Gazette 1995). European Economic Community consultants to the Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation emphasised that this sector of the market, particularly those looking for an up market ecotourist destination, should be encouraged in the future through an active marketing strategy targeting these groups as these visitors tended to spend more (personal communication with EXA consultant). South African tourists tend to bring their own food, their own caravan accommodation and therefore spend relatively little on their visits.

Zimbabwe does in fact favour a policy of high paying low volume tourists, and Zimbabwe's safari camp and lodge facilities often specifically market international visitors on an ecotourism basis. It is important to recognise that countries which want to expand their tourism receipts, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa can use the concept of ecotourism to justify growth in the industry from both a moral and an environmental standpoint regardless of whether the tourism practice that they sell is environmentally sound and socially beneficial. There are no regulations defining or governing ecotourism and therefore the term is essentially ambiguous and contestable. Tourists also feel the pressure to be more politically and ecologically correct visitors to foreign countries. They are therefore inclined to label themselves ecotourists, despite leaving their home countries on large resource consuming fossil fuelled aircraft[8].

One of Zimbabwe's premier destinations for wildlife and nature tourism is the Hwange National Park. Economic trends occurring around this park inform us of the likely outcomes and developments in other wildlife tourism destinations on the borders of other parks particularly in regard to the new experiments with ecotourism under the CAMPFIRE program[9]. Jones summary of tourist facility types and numbers of beds in the Gwayi commercial farming region bordering Hwange National Park indicates that twenty-two safari camps and lodges have been built since 1980 with a total of 368 beds. Eighteen of these were built since 1990 and two more are likely to be constructed in the near future (see Table 3).

Jones concludes that the proliferation of photographic safari camps and lodges that have sprung up in the last five years in this area has led to the safari camp sector of the market being over-traded leading to some operators being pushed out of the market. He also argues that "the competition has forced operators to reduce charges or increase commissions to maintain occupancy levels at a lower profit" (Jones and

---

[8] One safari operator in the Victoria Falls area has identified this need among tourists and offers tourists at an affluent hotel an opportunity to "meet the people". Tourist are taken to a local school where they observe school children, exchange addresses and may inspect infrastructural improvements such as boreholes and school blocks. When the tourists return to their home countries they may send items or money as a gift to individuals or to the school as a whole.

[9] Examples in the area include the Mahenye Lodge on the border of Gonarezhou National Park, The lodge at Mucheni Gorge on the border of Chizarira National Park and the lodge under construction on the Gorges below Victoria Falls near to the Victoria Falls Park.

Hasler 1994, 26). Jones supports his argument with data on the growth rate of bed availability in the Gwayi/Hwange area, which is three times higher than the increase in the number of visitor arrivals in Zimbabwe. However, he mentions that as safari camp lodges are mainly geared towards the high paying international tourists their business is most affected by the shortage of aircraft capacity servicing the Hwange park airport, but indicates that this capacity is likely to be increased in the near future. A significance of Jones's case study is that it indicates that a process towards mass tourism in this sector is currently building momentum, especially in the Hwange/Victoria Falls area. A study currently being undertaken on the Victoria Falls area has been partly instigated because of this concern about mass tourism.

A tendency towards developing mass sales through regional and international marketing networks (see opening paragraph of this paper) is likely to usher in a new era of mass tourism for Zimbabwe. This is a critical evaluative criteria for assessing the long term potential for and impacts of community based-tourism in communal areas next to national parks and protected areas in other parts of Zimbabwe. It is important to know if the process of expansion will in the long term replicate itself on communal land next to national parks. In this regard current legislation is in place to restrict the nature and type of tourism that takes place on communal land and environmental impact procedures, bureaucratic inertia, exclusive contracts for photographic concessions, differentiation of interests and lack of willing investment partners all militate against mass tourism in these communal areas at this point in time. However, the predicted increases in tourist arrivals indicate that this situation could rapidly change in those areas where mass tourism is already starting to take place. CAMPFIRE experiments with non-consumptive tourism have three general outcomes depending on the tourist resources that they market, the degree to which the market will expand, and the controls that are implemented in planing this kind of tourism:

1) They represent the exploratory phase of mass tourism and will ultimately have a negative effect on these communities unless strict measures continue to control tourism.

2) Because of leakage and added demand for revenue sharing many community based experiments will not be able to compete economically with other destinations where mass tourism is

taking place and will collapse because of lack of profit.

3) Extremely tight control of tourism development on communal land will allow for models of high paying low-volume tourism. Similar to the Kenyan case, the Zimbabwean context determines that this last option is not merely a matter of implementing the technical aspects of ecotourism. It is also inherently dependent on broader political and economic factors.

A PRECISE EXAMPLE OF ECOTOURISM:

CAMPFIRE and the Conundrum of the Green Elephant Kill

The Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) programme generates revenue for local people for the building of schools, clinics, grinding mills and household dividends[10] mainly via hunting concession lease agreements through district councils. This consumptive use of resources takes places on a sustainable yield basis on marginal agricultural land held under communal tenure. This is the most precise example of ecotourism that exists in the three countries considered because safari hunting under CAMPFIRE almost completely fulfils the definition of ecotourism as environmentally low impact and socially beneficial tourism. Direct economic benefits are received under CAMPFIRE[11], and the environmental and social costs of the programme are manageable. A process of building institutional capacity at the lowest levels is in place and this involves the creation of accountability over revenues. The negative impacts of non-consumptive tourism identified in the Kenya case studies can be managed and confined and the tendency towards mass tourism does not apply to hunting because of comparative numbers.

---

[10] Several household dividends have been distributed to villages and wards where animals have been shot (These usually range from Z$20 to Z$400 per household depending on the gross revenue accumulated.) Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management Guidelines for the distribution of wildlife revenue earned under CAMPFIRE stipulates that the district council should retain no more than 15% of gross revenue as a levy. Up to 35 percent may be allocated for district wildlife management. At least 50 percent of the revenue should be returned to the wards, villages and households where the animals were shot.

[11] Villages and wards receive revenues from trophy fees and concession lease agreements paid to district councils by safari operators. Some councils are more effective in devolving this revenue to wards than others, and the CAMPFIRE programme has been criticised for recentralizing control of wildlife at the district level.

An important source of revenue in the programme is the hunting of trophy elephants, which is staunchly opposed by the northern based green movement[12]. Safari hunting usually involves the setting up of a simple but tasteful tented or semi-permanent hunting camp, with pit latrine, the clearing of a landing field in a usually remote and relatively inaccessible concession area. Hunting usually entails one or two high paying client hunters being driven through the hunting concession area, until such time as they disembark to track or hide for their prey. A hunt may include a range of different species hunted over a period from a few days to three weeks (a typical twenty-one day hunt may include plains game such as kudu, wildebeest, as well as a buffalo, an elephant, a lion, etc). Hunting takes place on a sustainable quota system and therefore the client may have to visit different hunting concessions in order to obtain the hunting bag. A team of skinners and trackers is also associated with a hunt. Under CAMPFIRE these trackers are usually local people and the hunting team may also include a trainee hunter and guides from the local area. Zimbabwean ecologists and safari operators alike have long argued that safari hunting is far more ecologically friendly and economically viable than intensive photographic or nature tourism, because it involves a series of single high paying clients, the construction of a simple bush camp, and two or three four wheel drive vehicles on a network of main tracks. Non-consumptive safaris involve the building of luxury lodges and hotels, extensive vehicle use and congestion in parks, greater numbers of tourists and more capital outlay. Photographic tourism involves more vehicles, more tourists, more consumption and more waste in order to generate the similar amounts of revenue. Furthermore, this kind of tourism, involves more leakage because of the wide array of people involved resulting in less direct benefit to local communities. Most importantly, photographic tourism exhibits a greater tendency to become mass tourism as made evident by the Kenyan experience.

---

[12] The protectionist movement is concerned about extinction of animal species such as elephant and rhino and animal rights activists are concerned about the abuse or unethical treatment of animals subjected to hunting and culling. Zimbabweans have argued convincingly that large populations of elephants need to be managed to prevent them from destroying the wildlife habitat. Hunting quotas provide one means through which such population management can take place. A problem for the hunting lobby is the pressure that the protectionists can bring to bear through international trade agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The future of hunting as the best model of ecotourism in Africa is therefore threatened by these emotive elements in the green movement.

Though there is no legally enforced hunting season (Taylor 1994) hunts usually take place during the dry season (May to November) and the area is left to recover during the raining season. In general, hunting clients have little direct contact with local people, and as a result the commoditization and mutual exploitation symptomatic of mass tourism are less evident. However, the direct economic returns to local people from trophy hunting can be high as evidenced by the community projects such as schools and clinics and the household dividends distributed under the CAMPFIRE programme.

The problem with CAMPFIRE experiments has not been in generating significant revenues but rather in distributing the revenue equitably, and involving active participation of local people in management, rather than encouraging sleeping partners and passive receipt of hand-outs. Hunting revenue, especially that revenue generated by elephant hunting, is crucial for the success of consumptive ecotourism under CAMPFIRE. For example, in Nyaminyami District (Mashonaland West) Taylor estimated that 38 percent of the three year average hunting quota for 1989-1991 was related to elephants. For these years, Nyaminyami earned Z$1,273,503. The figure has since more than tripled. Taylor indicated that although non-consumptive tourism based on game viewing, walking and photographic safaris only generated 6 percent of the district's income in 1991, it was projected that non-consumptive tourism would soon earn triple the amount that was earned by hunting (Taylor 1994, 124). Lease fees paid by photographic safari operators for communal sites under a competitive tender process involving interviews with applicants has increased the value of these sites.[13] If Zimbabwe gradually becomes a mass tourism destination as evidenced in the tourist arrival statistics, it is likely that more and more tourist facilities will be built on communal land.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NON-CONSUMPTIVE TOURISM UNDER CAMPFIRE

The socio-cultural impacts of large numbers of photographic, cultural, nature or adventure tourists are that much more evident than a couple of high paying safari hunting clients. Tourist impacts on the culture and social system of the hosts are generally either neutral or negative

[13] Lease fees for Binga, Chipinge, Hurungwe, Hwange, Mzarabani and Nyaminyami Districts for photographic safaris were non existent in 1988. By 1993 Binga District was earning Z$53,452 and by 1995 Chipinge District earned Z$200,000. The trend towards added value of such sites is becoming increasingly clear.

(Smith 1989). An added problem is that non-consumptive use of wildlife resource use under CAMPFIRE does run the long term risk of becoming caught up in the boom and bust cycle of mass tourism; whereas hunting does not because it is based on a specialised elitist market. Under CAMPFIRE increasing interest is being shown in building semi-permanent photographic lodges on a concessionary lease basis contracted between district councils and tourist operators. Nature, culture and adventure tourism takes place with labour, cultural resources and raw materials for construction of the lodge being provided by local communities.

Mahenye Lodge in Chipinge District is an example of this kind of model ecotourist experiment on communal land. Situated on an island at the junction of the Sabi and Rundi confluence, the lodge provides access to the Gonarezhou National Park. The main attraction in this part of the park is for bird photography and identification in beautiful riverine woodland. Cultural tourism in the form of village tours does exist but on a very low level. The Mahenye Lodge is currently being extended from an 11 bed facility to a 40 bed facility and this growth in itself indicates that ecotourism cannot remain static and must continue growing in order to be economically viable. The current phase of a small ecotourist operation is reportedly running at a loss. Large hotel chains, such as the Zimbabwe Sun which runs Mahenye, are primarily concerned about increasing their segment of the wildlife market. Though such experiments may start with noble goals to conserve the environment and benefit people, the profit motive is an essential aspect. The lodge has however already provided some tangible benefits to local people:

* The lodge provides training and employment opportunities for local people in the tourist industry.

* It provides direct economic benefits through a lease agreement with the district council and the local wildlife committee. This revenue is used for community projects or for household dividends.

* It has been involved in local infrastructural improvements such as the extension of the electrification grid into Mahenye ward itself.

Potential negative long term impacts of the lodge may include:

* A lack of a coherent mechanism to deal with large numbers of tourist visiting local villages. The construction of a craft village has been proposed to deal with this problem.

* Projected negative affects include: commoditization of culture, dependency on tourism and hand-outs, problems occurring from increased differentiation of wealth within the community, squatter settlements, increased pollution and other environmental impacts on roads and the park. A potential threat is that tourism will abandon the area when problems arise (military activity in the area, health problems such as AIDS or malaria) leaving local people without a source of income that they have come to depend upon.

Short term losses reportedly being incurred by such lodges as Mahenye are off-set against the projected incomes from expanded operations on communal land. Small-scale, environmentally friendly, people oriented photographic ecotourism does not make enough money to interest large hotel chains. As in the Kenya examples, more and more economic pressure for expansion of these small ecotourist endeavours to larger mass tourism will become evident as our tourist population increases.

One could argue that CAMPFIRE is precisely what Kenyans were negotiating for in the seventies for the Amboseli and Maasai Mara County Council game reserves. CAMPFIRE has devolved rights of revenue generation from central government treasury to district council level through the Wild Life Act (1975) and its amendment (1982), but communities (which bear the costs of crop-raiding animals) do not as yet have a legal right to accrue revenue themselves. Usually what occurs is that a safari or tourist operator will contract a business deal through the district council for a concession lease of an area that has potential for hunting or photographic activities. Local people and local communities have representatives on the district council but in most cases of CAMPFIRE revenue generation there is a problem that communities are the sleeping partner in these transactions. The problem that the Kenyan park wardens tried to iron

out with the Maasai elders in the fifties is the same problem that faces the CAMPFIRE programme in the nineties.

In the Zimbabwean context the following technical aspects have to occur to enable ecotourism to take place:

1) Negotiation has to take place between the rural district council (the local authority for natural resource management on communal lands who co-operates with other government ministries), local people whose land is being used and representatives from the tourist and safari industry in order to create joint-venture agreements (Hasler 1994). Non-governmental organisations may facilitate this negotiation (e.g., World Wide Fund For Nature, ZimTrust or Centre for Applied Social Sciences - University of Zimbabwe). Precedents have been set under CAMPFIRE through which tenders for concession areas are advertised and local communities are involved in assessments and agreements of these tenders. The initiative may come from the tourist industry, local people or from the rural district council. Effective institutional mechanisms for participation of local people through wildlife management committees at local and district levels or the establishment of natural resource co-operatives is a prerequisite for these negotiations.

   Problems:

   a) The rural district council at best represents the interests of the entire district, not simply the areas where the tourist activities are to take place. Therefore, it is likely that local people may become sleeping partners in the tourist development. The loss of natural resources to tourism is a cost which may not be repaid adequately by the purported benefits.

   b) Leakage of revenue from tourism occurs at many levels, because of the many different parties involved in producing the product. A solution to this problem may partly lie in extended consultation and participation of local people in planning the proposed tourism development. Contractual agreements which specify the nature and mechanisms of benefits will also help.

2) Contractual agreements between the tourist industry, local government and local communities need to specify what are the benefits and costs of the tourism: local employment, infrastructural improvement, lease fees, percentage of gross or net profits, long term ownership of the initiative, training, mechanism through which revenue and benefits are to reach the local level all need to be spelt out ie. revenue will be channelled through district council, decisions on it will be made by local wildlife committees. Leakage and loopholes in this need to be identified. For instance, in the Zimbabwean context the law needs to be changed to give legal rights over wildlife to local communities.

3) Consultation and contractual agreements on mechanisms for revenue sharing with local communities must be part of the overall agreement. Analysis of who benefits and who will pay the costs needs to be presented as part of the agreement.

4) Tourist development must take place away from the usual residential areas because the social and cultural costs of having it in the community itself are too great. Cultural tourism reduces cultural exchanges to economic transactions which effectively commoditizes culture. The Kenyan experience makes this very clear.

5) Further expansion of agreed tourist facilities in a trend towards mass tourism must be curtailed. This should be enforced through regulations, bye-laws and through the establishment of exclusive contracts.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECOTOURISM DILEMMA

In 1992 South Africa attracted 2.7 million visitors. 2.1 of these arrived from Africa, mainly for business or shopping. 560,000 arrived from abroad mainly from Europe. In 1993, 3 million arrived of which 2.4 million were from Africa and 618,500 were from overseas (Satour 1993, 27). Kerzner estimates that within three to four years of the elections South Africa will attract an additional million high paying tourists per year each spending ten to twelve days in hotels (The

Western Cape, 1994/95). South Africa is poising itself for a massive increase in tourist arrivals.

The recent political changes in South Africa have highlighted both the environmental concerns about sustainable use of resources and the political concerns about equitable use of resources by historically disadvantaged groups. The two issues are not exactly the same, and projects need to critically evaluate whether they are fusing the two. Ecotourism is presented as a panacea which seems to solve the problem by providing the engine for rural reconstruction (see Koch 1994). "Community based" approaches to south Africa's environmental and equity problems tend to proceed as if the historical, economic and political processes which removed people from land, marginalized education and reduced rights of access to resources had never existed ie. as if disadvantaged communities were indeed magically empowered. Experience with CAMPFIRE has made it clear that "communities" do not exist in a political and economic vacuum. "Communities" are in a sense manifestations of the political and economic structures within which they have their being. The need for policy and legal review, identification of institutional mechanism to facilitate management of local resources (such as the development of local development organisations or local government) may be more important than ad vocative participatory approaches at this point in South African history, because existing structures of government and existing legislation still exist (much of which was designed during the apartheid era) which has historically marginalized such disadvantaged communities.

A key question in the New South Africa is how does one define the community that will benefit from tourism? Disadvantaged communities are part of broader processes of reform that are taking place at national, regional and local level (e.g., through trade unions, political parties, local government, etc.). The political economy of tourism is not based in these disadvantaged "communities" because it centres on international and national capital and therefore it really is a misnomer to talk about community based tourism. What communities can do is respond to market trends. This response in itself indicates that "communities" are not discrete bounded and homogeneous entities. They are fluid and responsive to the hierarchies of government, economics and politics.

COMMUNITY-BASED TOURISM PRECEDENTS

An obvious place to start in unravelling this process is to look at the historical precedents that have been set for community based tourism in South Africa. The historical pattern of tourism in homelands and peripheral areas has been for large capital intensive developments, particularly casino hotels involving deals between previous homeland governmental or political structures and big capital. Often the big attraction was the lack of laws controlling gambling, interracial sex and other forbidden fruits such as pornographic films (Lea 1988). The Royal Swazi Spar was one of the first of these closely followed by the Holiday Inn complex in Maseru. A series of other complexes followed on the borders of the Ciskei, Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Kwazulu. This form of tourism was often characterised by ostentatious wealth in a sea of poverty and there were very high social costs incurred. Lea estimated that at least three quarters of the slot-machine clientele were local people whose low incomes could not afford to engage in such pursuits without forfeiting basic food, clothing and education.

PILANSBURG NATIONAL PARK (Sun City, Lost City)

A current example of massive investment in a previous homeland is the Lost City complex, which is a US$240 million investment that borders the Pilansburg Game Reserve in Boputhatswana. A three hundred and fifty bed hotel built along ethnic lines includes, a casino, recreation centre imitation ocean and beach and an artificial rain forest including 1.6 million plants. Two other luxury hotels surround this park: the Sun City and Marula Lodge. According to Koch, the Pilansburg National Park is regarded as one of the most successful ecotourism experiments in South Africa and is seen as tackling the twin criteria of ecotourism: benefiting people and conserving the environment (1994, 11).

Ironically, the establishment of the park in 1979 involved, and was followed by, much dispute about:

* the expropriation of grazing land of local communities;

* impounding of cattle entering the Sun City complex;

* unfair remuneration of Sun City employees: and

* alleged exploitation of funds by the local authority.

Koch refers to this episode as a "prime example of progressive rhetoric being used to describe what remained, in essence, a repressive form of economic development" (1994, 32). Under recent management, involving the setting up of community development organisations in the surrounding communities, more success in gaining local participation in benefits from the park has been achieved. The serious effort to build local institutions involved nominations from both local government (tribal authority) and an equal number of ordinary citizens. It is claimed that the negative view of the park by local people no longer exists. Yet Koch points out that after 10 years in existence the park still relies on funding for development and operational costs.

This massive investment potential indicates that ecotourist experiments in South Africa may be subjected to very powerful economic interests in the tourism industry, once they establish clientele and develop the potential of a destination, paving the way, for mass tourism. This is exacerbated by the fact that ecotourism is perceived as a means by which economic growth can be achieved. An essential issue in the South African economy is the creation of jobs. In this regard, it is hoped that tourism will become the number one industry in South Africa by the year 2,000. and that it will kick start the economy for the rural reconstruction (Koch 1994, 12). This indicates that what South Africa is really heading towards is the boom and bust cycle of mass tourism with the omission of serious mechanisms for sharing of profits and benefits with local people. Here lies a major contradiction in the definition of ecotourism, as high levels of economic growth, such as those needed to kick start the South African economy, will demand mass tourism at the long term expense of environmental conservation and social equity issues.

MTHETHOMUSHA

According to New Ground Magazine, the Mthethomusha reserve bordering the Kruger National park was first discussed in 1984, when negotiation took place between the KaNgwane Parks Corporation and local traditional leaders in regard to the establishment of an

ecotourism and conservation area in dry mountainous territory near the park (1991/92, No.6, 16). Job creation (some two hundred jobs were created most of which were taken by people from nearby villages), and revenue generation from a luxury lodge goes to the tribal authority. The lodge is currently managed by a large hotel chain. 60 percent of the income (it is not specified whether this is net income or gross income) goes to the tribal authority, who have formed a trust company. Revenue has been spent mainly on classroom blocks and creches. New Ground Magazine indicates that there has been some discussion about broadening participation in this project as the tribal authority is not representative of the elected civic and democratic organisations in the villages surrounding the reserve.

This project raises the same questions that the Kenyan and CAMPFIRE material raises:

* What is the long term prospect for such tourism?

* With a large hotel chain involved in producing the product, the market will determine the nature and development of this tourism option. Will it inexorably become mass tourism?

* Will revenue sharing create low profit margins which will put such schemes out of business before local people have been sufficiently trained to manage and run the lodge themselves?

* Can such contingency issues be planned for at the local level?

The track record from Kenya and Zimbabwe indicates that "communities" respond passively to the market. Internal differentiation of perspectives at community level hampers cohesive management plans, while differentiation of political and economic forces on tourism markets and their management at district, national and international levels directly affect local outcomes within communities. The issue of accountability of local authorities, (are they accountable to central government or to their constituents?) also raises the question in the New South Africa of whether such schemes

are appropriately designed only for the benefit of "local" people, especially when they are a buffer on national resources such as a national park.

Experience with CAMPFIRE indicates that naive definitions of local communities as homogeneous, self contained, and as existing outside of the existing political and economic currents which largely determine the success of projects can seriously flaw such initiatives from the start. A series of economic and political levels are in fact articulated through such schemes and not involving appropriate political levels in the protocols of designing such schemes can back-fire. Usually these entities will include local government, local community as defined through development or conservation associations or committees, private sector and non governmental organisations. Having said this, the biggest problem that the CAMPFIRE programme has had is in identifying "communities"[14] and working towards the attainment of legal rights of access for local resources by local people given the existing legislation.

OTHER ECOTOURISM EXAMPLES

The Richtersveldt experiment is essentially a "contract park" in the north Western Cape (Koch 1994, 32). The park is important from a biodiversity perspective, and has 1,000 species of succulents. In the late 1980's, a dispute arose between the indigenous inhabitants of the area, and the South African National Parks Board over the latter's intention to proclaim a nature reserve and to remove pastoral people living there. The local people refused to move and were supported by human rights groups and academics from Cape Town. The local people

[14] In the Zimbabwean political economy, the "community" can be thought of as an onion, with layer after layer of community identity peeling away to reveal further community identity. For example, the political order can be seen in terms of levels: international, national, provincial, district, ward, village, households. This segmentary definition of community is possible because so many issues impinging on local outcomes are defined at higher levels. For example, CITES debates largely determine whether elephants will be traded directly influencing revenue to local people. National politics and policy influence who has access to resources, district interests may see these resources as belonging to them, while ward, village and household may regard the same resources as falling under their jurisdiction. A compromise between these different levels of access rights and a mixture of interests including the state, local communities and the private sector is what has become known as co-management.

negotiated a right to remain in the area, continue grazing their livestock and also successfully negotiated for revenue and jobs from the park. A management committee was established to deal with these and other questions. Similarly in Maputaland resource sharing takes place with conservation agencies allowing local people access to identified resources such as reeds or fish, and tribal authorities received 25 percent of all revenue accruing from gate takings for social upliftment projects. "Kosi bay and Tomb areas have received negative publicity because of a significant gap at least in the past between their rhetoric and practice" of ecotourism (Koch 1994, 24). In general, the mechanisms by which benefits reach local communities, and deciding who in these communities are going to benefit is not sufficiently understood, thus in Maputaland the setting up of community based game reserves, resulted in secessionist organisations. A crucial role is played by private sector investment in developing the lodges and tourist camps, but the danger, as in the CAMPFIRE program, is that the partnership between local authority, private sector and local community involves at least one if not two sleeping partners.

South Africa's private reserves are setting many of the trends in ecotourism. The Conservation Corporation runs the Londolozi Lodge in the Eastern Transvaal and the Phinda Lodge in Maputaland. The Corporation has an active policy of providing economic opportunities, skills, financial support and high paying jobs to local neighbours. The Corporation has set up a rural investment fund to engage in infrastructural projects in the poor areas neighbouring their reserves. Koch's account sites roads, a water reticulation project, entertainment centres, an airport for Gazankulu homeland, a donation of R100,000 for small business men in the area surrounding Phinda, and also the subsidising of schools and clinics... all this in the attempt to attain legitimacy for a luxury ecotourist industry (Koch 1994, 35).

This indicates again that ecotourism in South Africa is often "Big Business" and "Big Promises". The temptation for the ecotourism industry is to portray itself as a panacea for all the problems of development that have accrued through history and as a result some of its claims become quite far fetched. It certainly is not possible for the ecotourist industry to become the economic engine for widespread development without becoming a mass tourism industry.

A key problem is the appropriate institutional mechanism for community representation, accountability and effectiveness. This problem also exists in Kenya and in the CAMPFIRE program. Traditional leaders, democratically elected leaders, labour leaders, charismatic leaders, church leaders, special interest group or occupation leaders, government appointees, political party leaders, higher levels of government etc all need to be consulted. Civic organisations, tribal authorities, municipal and district\county authorities, regional authorities all have some interest in ecotourism projects in their areas especially if it involves communal land or common property resources.

At the time of writing, South Africa's local government elections have not yet taken place. The nature, role and functions which local government in the New South Africa will play, and the various manifestations of this under the diverse local conditions obviously will affect ecotourism. As we have seen the Kenyans have abandoned local government as means through which ecotourism revenue can be equitably distributed. Under CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe is channelling its revenue through district councils and this is generally proving to be effective but is facing a big problem of accountability for and distribution of revenue. South Africa needs to make policy and legal decisions about the role of local government in community revenue generation projects. The most likely outcome is a community co-management model for South Africa, involving local government, non-governmental organisations, voluntary and civic associations and special interest groups such as co-operatives and trusts.

An important long term opportunity exists for South Africa to avoid some of the pitfalls and problems that have been faced in Kenya and Zimbabwe in regard to the recentralisation of control over resources at district\regional level. It needs to limit the legal entrenchment of economic redistribution faculties through local government. Instead legal mechanisms by which local people can manage revenues accruing from the management of their natural resources should be identified under the umbrella of local government.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

This itself is potentially full of conflict in the short term as events in South Africa bear testimony. For example, the Phola Park shanty-settlement near Johannesburg was apparently a model of participatory

planning and development, a democratic development committee was established by an NGO to upgrade the informal housing settlement, but on the day the site and service scheme was to begin, the office of the development committee was attacked by men with guns and the scheme had to be shelved. The problem allegedly was that marginalized migrant workers, illegal residents and criminals benefited from the informal nature of the settlement. Another example is the Community trusts set up to deal with quotas from the fishing industry. Because people do not always regard these trusts as representative of their own interests, and because people want some immediate benefit to redress the historical injustices embedded in the fishing industry it has added fuel to an already volatile situation. Ironically in this situation it may prove to be more appropriate for local government to manage these revenues on behalf of the local trusts until such time as the management capacity has increased and the squabbles have been ironed out. In South Africa, this indicates that a crucial criteria for the success of community based development including ecotourism, is that the undertaking of any such initiative does not initially aggravate unmanageable conflict. Conflict is an inevitable part of the development process and therefore mechanisms of conflict resolution have to evolve. These only emerge in a case by case basis and therefore adaptive management is an important strategy that can be learnt from previous programs both in SA and elsewhere. Another important lesson from the Phola Park experience is that there must be both short term and long term objectives, while the institutional capacity of communities is building.

CAMPFIRE has made it abundantly clear that "communities" are internally divided and differentiated. They are not homogeneous, and there are not necessarily one set of overriding interests. The challenge for South Africa is to try to identify resources and institutions which can build cohesion rather than provide a bone of contention. Institutions that can deal with dispute resolution at the local and higher levels are therefore crucial in the South African context. I presume that the local government that emerges after October 1995 will be working towards such a role, but this assumption may not be true for all areas or all cases. Experience from other countries also indicates that power tends to centralise so this may not be the full answer to South Africa's local level resource management questions.

* Mitigating environmental impacts of mass tourism phase by planning ahead.

* Planning ahead for the potential collapse of the mass tourism industry once established.

"Successful" tourism depends on growth and tourist needs and perceptions continually change. Growth in tourism brings further impacts. This paper argues that planning ecotourism initiatives must have a long term view of where tourism leads, and a self-reflective weighing up of the negative impacts of competing land use strategies must be seen from both a long- term and short-term perspective.

The Ecotourism Society (1993). Ecotourism Guidelines for Nature Tour Operators. North Bennington (Vermount, USA): The Ecotourism Society.

EXA International/CHL Consulting Group (1993) Proposed Marketing Policy and Strategy Zimbabwe. Harare: ZTDC.

Systems Publishers. (1995) "Dear World...Wish you were here." The Western Cape. Johannesburg: Systems Publishers.

South African Tourism Board (1993) Foreign Tourist Arrivals in South Africa.

Freeman, M.R. and U.P. Kreuter (eds) (1994) Elephants and Whales Resources for Whom? London and New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.

Gakahu C.G. and Goode B.E. (1994) Ecotourism and Sustainable Development in Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: Wildlife Conservation International and Space Sellers Limited.

Gakahu C.G. (1992) Tourist Attitudes and Use Impacts in Maasai Mara National Reserve. Proceedings of a workshop organised by Wildlife Conservation International at Maasai Mara National Reserve, Wildlife Conservation International.

Goodman, P.S. (1993) The Ol-Choro Oiroua Wildlife Management and Conservation Association: People, Wildlife and Optimum Land Use in the Maasai Mara Region of Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: Mimeograph Ol Choro Oiroua Wildlife Management Association.

Hasler, R. (in Press) Agriculture, Foraging and Wildlife Resource Use in Africa: Cultural and Political Dynamics in the Zambezi Valley. London: Kegan Paul International.

Hasler, R. (1994a) Conceptualizing Community Based Tourism Under CAMPFIRE: Unanswered Resource Management Questions from Hwange, Binga and Other Districts. Paper presented at the Lessons of the Natural Resource Management Program, September, Centre for Applied Social Science. Harare, Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe.

Hasler, R. (1994b) Brokering the Community Basis of Tourism Potential Under CAMPFIRE in the Hwange Communal Area. Centre for Applied Social Sciences. Harare, Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe.

IIED (1994) Whose Eden? An Overview of Community Approaches to Wildlife Management. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Jones, M.A. and Hasler, R. (1994) Feasibility Study for a Sustainable Tourism Development Project at the Gwayi River Mine. Matabeleland Development Foundation and Transferzentrum Furangepabte Technologie (TAT) Rheine.

Kaufman, D. (1994) "Planning for Tourism Development: The Marketing Mix Approach-Basic Checklist", in M.A. Jones (ed.), Proceedings of the Natural Resource Management Project Seminar and Workshop: Safari Operations in Communal Areas in Matabeleland. Harare, Zimbabwe: Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management.

Kenya Wildlife Service (1990) A Policy Framework and Development Programme 1991-1996. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Kenya Wildlife Service (1990) "Annex 1: Organizational Structure and Management", in A Policy Framework and Development Programme 1991-1996. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Kenya Wildlife Service (1990) "Annex 2: Revenue Sharing", in A Policy Framework and Development Programme 1991-1996. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Kenya Wildlife Service (1990) "Annex 3: Development and Management of Tourism in Parks", A Policy Framework and Development Programme 1991-1996. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Kenya Wildlife Service (1990) "Annex 4: National Park and Reserve Planning", in: A Policy Framework and Development Programme 1991-1996. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Kenya Wildlife Service (1990) "Annex 6: Community Conservation and Wildlife Management outside Parks and Reserves", in A Policy Framework and Development Programme 1991-1996. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Kenya Wildlife Service (1990) "Annex 10: Land-Use Planning and Management in Kenya", A Policy Framework and Development Programme 1991-1996. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Killian, Fr. (1991) Education Among the Maasai. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Sheffield, England: University of Sheffield.

Koch, E. (1994) Reality or Rhetoric?: Ecotourism and Rural Reconstruction in South Africa. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Discussion Paper. Geneva, Switzerland.

Lea, J. (1988) Tourism and Development in the Third World. London: Routledge.

Financial Gazette (1995) "London Consultants Give Tips on Local Tourism.", p.7, 3rd August, Harare.

Murphree, M.W. (1993) Communities as Resource Management Institutions. London: International Institute for Environment and Development. Gate Keeper Series.

Environmental Development Agency (1991/2) New Ground, No.14, Summer, Newtown, South Africa.

Norton-Griffiths, M. (1993) "The long term conservation of wildlife on the rangelands of the Serengeti Eco-system," in: A.R. Sinclair and P. Arcese (eds.), Serengeti II: Research and Management for Eco-system Conservation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schutte, D.W. (1995) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Fishermen's Community Trusts. Cape Town: Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.

Shaw, G. (1994) "What remedy for tourism industry", Sunday Nation, December 4th, Nairobi.

Smith, V.L. and Eadington, W. R. (eds) (1994) "Tourism Alternatives: Potentials and Problems", in: The Development of Tourism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Smith, V.L. (1989) Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sobers (undated) "The Tourism Self Destruct Syndrome," in: C.G. Gakahu and B. Goode (eds), Ecotourism and Sustainable Development in Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: Wildlife Conservation International.

Taylor, R. (1994) "Elephant Management in the Nyaminyami District, Zimbabwe: Turning a Liability into an Asset," in: R. Freeman and U. Kreuter, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? United Kingdom: Gordon and Breach.

Western, D. (1994) "Ecotourism: the Kenya Challenge," in: C.G. Gakahu and B.E. Goode (eds.), Ecotourism and Sustainable Development in Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: Wildlife Conservation International.

Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation (1994) Zimbabwe Tourism Development Corporation Visitor Arrivals Statistics. Harare, Zimbabwe: ZTDC.

APPENDICES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES



Figure 1: Evolutionary Catch 22 of a Successful Ecotourism Era
(Successful ecotourism leads to mass tourism)



Figure 2: Diagram indicating the links between various components (production and distribution) of the tourism marketing mix. (*From Kaufman, 1994*)



Figure 3: Rate of increase in number of beds at safari camps and lodges in the Gwayi Region. *(Source: Jones in Jones and Hasler 1994, 25)*



Figure 4: Trends in regional and international visitor arrivals to Zimbabwe: 1980-1992. *(Source: Jones in Jones and Hasler, 1994)*

Year	World	Africa	Kenya		
	(in millions of arrivals)		Arrivals	Change	Earnings K£ mil*
1980	284.8	7.1	362,000	4.14	82.5
1981	288.9	8.0	352,000	-2.84	90.0
1982	286.8	7.8	362,000	2.76	118.0
1983	284.2	8.2	333,000	-8.71	122.0
1984	312.4	8.9	453,000	26.49	152.0
1985	326.5	9.9	541,000	16.27	209.0
1986	334.5	9.5	604,000	10.43	250.0
1987	361.2	10.0	662,000	8.76	292.0
1988	393.2	12.7	676,900	2.20	349.0
1989	405.3	13.3	713,800	5.45	432.0

*K£=KSh20

le 1: International Tourist Arrivals in Kenya, 1980-1989
(Source: C.G. Gakahu and B. Goode, 1994, p75)

Year	Arrivals	% Occupancy			
		Zimbabwe	Vic Falls	Hwange	Main Camp
1980	268418	43			
1981	372436	40		34	
1982	331740	37		39	
1983	276864	33	25	31	24
1984	314383	34	30	32	42
1985	361646	38	40	33	47
1986	395091	37	33	34	54
1987	454779	36	34	33	45
1988	451844	41	40	34	49
1989	466161	45	50	44	71
1990	582602	47	55	51	40
1991	636676	50	57	55	52
1992	703279	46	57	49	63
1993		41	51	40	59
Rate of Change %	8.4%	0.5%	8.6%	3.1%	10.2%

Table 2: Tourism arrivals in Zimbabwe, hotel occupancy rates in Zimbabwe, Victoria Falls and Hwange, and occupancy rates for National Parks accommodation at Main Camp. *(Jones in Jones and Hasler 1994, 11)*